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[ VOL. 40

CPLR 3122: Five-day limitation inapplicable where CPLR 3120
notice is defective.
In Mustapich v. Huntington Union Free School Dist. No. 3,202
plaintiff sought discovery of accident reports and statements, failing,
however, to specify with reasonable particularity the documents
_sought to be inspected. Thereafter, defendant moved for a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3122 but not within the five-day
period of limitation. In upholding defendant's motion, the court
held that in order for the five-day limitation of 3122 to be applicable, the notice served under 3120 must comply with its (3120's)
provisions. "If the notice is totally in disregard of the provisions
203
of Rule 3120, it cannot be said to be a notice under the rule."
"Statement of readiness" rule inapplicable to a
notice to admit.
Recently the general rulemaking power of the appellate
O
In Rovegno v.
4 and CPLR 3123 came into conflict.
division2
Lush, 20 5 plaintiffs filed, pursuant to appellate division rules, 206
a statement of readiness and, long after, served a notice to admit
the truth of certain facts under CPLR 3123. Defendant moved
.pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order on the ground that
plaintiffs waived their right to serve a notice to admit upon the
filing of a statement of readiness. The defendant's motion was
made in the face of 3123's unqualified provision permitting a
party to serve a notice to admit up to twenty days before trial.
Thus the court was faced with a conflict. The court resolved the
conflict by stating that the rulemaking power of the appellate
division may not be used to contravene existing statutory law, and
that the construction sought to be placed on the rule in question
the provisions of
would do just that, i.e., amend and abridge
0 7
CPLR 3123 concerning a notice to admit.
CPLR 3123:

ARTIcLE

32-
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CPLR 3211(a) (7):
Pelnik,20 1

In Infusino v.
to recover commissions.
202

2 3

a real estate broker brought an action
The defendant moved to dismiss under

46 Misc. 2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
Id. at 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 41. See Rios v. Donovan, mupra note 177,

which defines the procedure to be followed with respect to notices to admit.
"[S]pecify with particularity" are the key words.
204 CPLR 3401 confers this rulemaking power.
205 45 Misc. 2d 579, 257 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1965).
206 N.Y. App. Div. R. II, pt. 7 (2d Dep't 1964).
207

For an extensive treatment of this case, see 7B McIKiNN's CPLR

3123, supp. commentary 34 (1965).

20845 Misc. 2d 333, 256 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct Oneida County 1965).
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CPLR 3211(a)(7), for failure to state a cause of action, and
asked that his motion be treated as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c).209
After reviewing all of the
papers before it, the court declined to exercise its power to so
treat the motion, on the simple ground that the papers were not
sufficiently complete to enable it to determine as a matter of law
that the plaintiff had no cause of action.
It is only when, upon a CPLR 3211 motion, the entirety of
papers before the court is so thorough and complete that the
court can determine from them that no substantial issue of fact
is involved that the court can treat a motion to dismiss as one
for summary judgment and dispose of it as if it were a motion
originally made under 3212.210 Where the papers before the
court are insufficient to justify a motion for summary judgment
under 3212, they are, ipso facto, insufficient to allow an exercise
of the treat-as-summary-judgment power of 3211(c) .211
CPLR 3212(a): Motion for summary judgment where
third-party defendant not joined in the action.
In Koreska v. United Cargo Corp.,212 plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment was granted before the answering time of the
third-party defendant had expired. The appellate division held
that lack of notice of the motion presented no procedural bar to
the granting of such motion.
It is true, of course, that whether or not the third-party
defendant is to have any liability at all depends upon whether
the plaintiff recovers anything from the defendant (third-party
plaintiff). Thus, any matter that would affect plaintiff's claim
would be of vital importance to the third-party defendant. It is
this interest which CPLR 1008 recognizes in permitting the thirdparty defendant to submit whatever the defendant could have interposed to defeat the plaintiff.2 1 3 The same consideration would
seem due the third-party defendant when a summary judgment
motion is made by the plaintiff.
20 CPLR 3211(c) allows the court to treat a 3211(a) or (b) motion
as a motion for summary judgment.
2104 WEINSTEIN,
KORN & MMILE, op. cit. supra note 196, fr 3212.02.
211 Cf. Cohen v. Dannia, 7 App. Div. 2d 886, 181 N.Y.S.2d
220 (4th
Dep't 1959); Di Sabato v. Soffes, 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184
(lst Dep't 1959).
21223 App. Div. 2d 37, 258 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1965); cf. American
Surety Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 3 Misc. 2d 363, 367-68, 154 N.Y.S.2d
260, 263-64 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd mer., 3 App. Div. 2d 831, 162 N.Y.S.2d
334 (1st Dep't 1957).
213 Mansfield Iron Works, Inc. v. Silveri, 106 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct.
1951) ; see Bobrose Dev., Inc. v. Jacobson, 251 App. Div. 825, 296 N.Y. Supp.
520 (2d Dep't 1937).

